Early Childbearing and the Option to Postpone
Por:
Bianca Zuluaga
No. 27, Junio de 2011
Borradores de economía y finanzas

Editor
Jhon James Mora
Jefe, Departamento de Economía
jjmora@icasi.edu.co

Gestión editorial
Departamento de Economía – Universidad Icaesi

Contenido:

1. Introduction ......................................................... 1
2. The model ............................................................. 5
   2.1 Solving the Maximization Problem ......................... 7
   2.2 Optimal childbearing decision-making path ............... 9
3. Differences among types of women ............................ 12
4. Calibration ............................................................ 14
5. Simulation ............................................................. 17
6. Before concluding .................................................. 20
7. Conclusions .......................................................... 24
Appendix ........................................................................ 25
References ....................................................................... 26

28 Páginas

ISSN 1990-1568

Segunda Edición, Junio de 2011
Early Childbearing and the Option to Postpone

Blanca Zuluaga
Universidad Icesi - Catholic University of Leuven
March 22, 2011

Abstract
This paper uses the option value theory to analyse whether there exists a value in postponing childbearing for a young woman. The main insights are based on the idea that the costs of bearing tend to decrease with time and, in addition, are subject to uncertainty. Both factors create a value of waiting until a certain critical cost or threshold is reached. We make the analysis for different types of women according to their socioeconomic (income) characteristics. We find important differences in the value of postponing for different types, and show the relevance of considering the option to postpone when deciding to bear the first child. This analysis suggests that, as long as the possibilities of poorer women to reach high schooling achievements increase, they will optimally choose an older age to begin childbearing. In other words, early childbearing by impoverished women might be seen as a rational reaction to their disadvantaged situation, where opportunities to reach high achievements are low, independently of the presence of a child.

1 Introduction

The tendency of fertility among the poor, measured as the average number of children per woman, has been decreasing in most of the developing countries during the last years with the exception of Africa. It seems that the current problem is not only about the number of children poor women bear, but the age at which they begin bearing their first child. Table 1 shows some basic statistics for Colombian women between 20 and 49 years old. The second and third columns correspond to the percentage of women who have given birth before the age of 18 and 23, respectively. Given its high incidence in all groups of income and especially among the poor, early childbearing is the issue we are interested in here. The third column of table 1 shows that poor Colombian

1 I would like to thank my supervisor Erik Schokkaert for making me interested in the topic of irreversibility of investment and for his always helpful orientation. I am also grateful to professor Paul de Grauwe for his advice and constant encouragement. Vera Zainoedetta, Javier Olivera and Koen Deconinck gave useful comments to a previous version of the paper. Finally, I am grateful to Profamilia - Colombia for providing the data base of the "National Survey of Demography and Health". Any mistake is mine alone.
women have, on average, twice the number of children compared to wealthy women, which may also be related to their early entrance into motherhood.

Table 1: Age at First Birth and Average Number of Children

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quintile of poverty</th>
<th>% of women first birth before age 18</th>
<th>% of women first birth before age 23</th>
<th>Average number of children</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very poor</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>3.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>poor</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>2.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>medium</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>2.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rich</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>1.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>very rich</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>1.51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculations from Prohantía - Colombia.

Is there any value for a young woman to postpone childbearing? This is the main question that this paper seeks to answer. The existing literature concerning the relationship between early childbearing and future socioeconomic attainments of young mothers shows us very divergent conclusions. A group of studies concludes that early childbearing considerably affects the future performance of women, constituting a negative event without which the young mother could reach higher attainments. Another group of studies assures that the poor performance of some young mothers is not the consequence of their early entrance into motherhood, instead, their disadvantaged background prevents them to do better independently of the presence of a child.

Classifying studies according to the methodology employed, there are four identified groups: i) those treating age at first birth as an exogenous variable affecting certain socioeconomic outcome of the mother, e.g. Waite and Moore (1978) and Williams (1996). These studies find considerable negative effects of early motherhood on women's achievements. ii) Papers using Instrumental Variable techniques, e.g. Klepinger et al. (1999a, 1999b). Early entrance into motherhood is treated as an endogenous variable. This group of studies find a lower -compared to i)- but still important negative effect on future performance of young mothers. iii) Studies considering a control group - e.g. sibling comparisons (Geronimus and Korenman (1992, 1993)), classmates matching (Levine and Painter (2003)) - iv) those derived from a natural experiment - e.g. twins comparisons (Groger and Bronars (1993)), teen mothers experiencing miscarriages (Hofst et al. (1997)). The two last groups of studies find only a small effect of early childbearing on future socioeconomic attainments of women, concluding that preventing childbearing does not guarantee a considerable increase in achievements of already disadvantaged mothers. Those results cast doubts on the direction of causality from early childbearing to low socioeconomic achievements that was assumed in the earlier contributions on the topic.

What is then the right direction of the causality in the relationship between early childbearing and schooling attainments or any other socioeconomic
achievement? The argument based on the evident time rivalry between being a mother and studying, may be used to support either causality direction: On the one hand, early parenthood may prevent young mothers to spend time in schooling investment. On the other hand, given the time rivalry between the two activities (motherhood and human capital accumulation), women with high schooling expectations prefer to postpone childbearing. Indeed, there is a general acceptance of this last idea (Riddiss et al. (1984)). In addition, previous researches have questioned the direction from young motherhood to low educational achievements. We have already mentioned the conclusions of the group of studies using natural experiments to check the causal effect of teenage childbearing on a teen mother’s subsequent socioeconomic performance: preventing early childbearing does not ensure an improvement in achievements of already disadvantaged mothers. Another contribution in this direction is the paper of Upchurch and McCarthy (1990). They find that adolescent maternity does not always lead to educational deprivation; controlling for social background and personal features, childbearing does not increase the probability of leaving school. Haggstrom et al. (1981) find no support for the negative effects of teenage parenthood on ambitions and attainments. Although it is true that non teenager parents perform better on most of the measured outcomes - educational, vocational, and personal development - than their classmates who experienced an early entrance toparenthood, the differences are explained by other characteristics of the individuals and their environment and not for the early childbearing. In addition, Kantorová (2002) find that highly educated women postpone childbearing even beyond the end of schooling, because they want to form their position on labor market before their entry into motherhood. On the contrary, women with university degree have restricted prospects on the labor market. Thus, they are less motivated than more educated women to postpone childbearing in order to construct their labor career.

There might still be controversy on this issue, but it is definitely very plausible that having high schooling goals causes delay of the entrance to motherhood. This is the direction of causality we are exploring here, giving great importance to the costs of early maternity in terms of future educational achievements. It cannot be denied that there are other cost of childbearing as forgone wages, job opportunities, travel opportunities, social networking, among others. However, in this paper we have chosen to analyze a reduced form of the cost, i.e. the forgone schooling investment. We do this because education is the main concern of this dissertation and also because these type of childbearing costs evolve with time as suggested by the model used here.

We will use a real option model (Dixit and Pindyck D&P (1994)) to explain under which circumstances a young woman would be better off by delaying her first birth. A firm must take into account future costs and opportunities when deciding whether or not to invest. Likewise, a woman should consider the same factors when deciding the optimal time for having her first child, given the irreversibility of her action. As far as we know, Iyer and Vein I&V (2006) were the first to use the real option approach to model the timing of the women's decision to have children. In their model, the net benefits of children are subject to
uncertainty, which determines the 'value of waiting' and, therefore, the spacing and delay of an additional child. The added value of this paper compared to I&V and other previous contributions is that we further explore the costs of an early first childbearing, emphasizing the way those costs evolve with time. Additional contributions are the analysis of the decision making process according to the socioeconomic background of women and the calibration of the model based on Colombian data.

We use a real option approach because it seems to be suitable to model the rational choice of a woman deciding the age to enter motherhood, since the costs she faces by exercising the option of having the first child are decreasing and uncertain. The approach is useful to give theoretical support to the argument that high educational aspirations lead to rationally postpone childbearing.

In our model, a woman chooses the optimal age for her first child, i.e. the age at which the net benefits of childbearing are maximized. A relevant point is that a simple Net Present Value (NPV) evaluation is not enough to carry out the right decision. There might exist a positive 'value of waiting' that should be considered as well. Early childbearing is an appropriate case to analyze in the context of option value theory, since first, its costs are at least partly irreversible (unrecoverable sunk costs), and second, the decision can be delayed so that the woman has the opportunity to wait for new information to arrive about uncertain costs. According to D&P, these characteristics of an investment make NPV analysis insufficient.

In many cases, bearing a child as an adolescent is more an accident than a choice. However, this unplanned event is the result of a sequence of decisions or choices the woman has made before. The first choice is to have sexual intercourse; the second one is to do it without using contraceptive methods. If pregnancy occurs, a woman may choose to interrupt it, either legally where this is possible, or illegally as often occurs in countries with prohibitive abortion laws. Following this reasoning, even when early childbearing has been an accident and not a choice, it is an unplanned consequence of a sequence of previous choices.

Section 2 presents the model. Nature has given women an investment opportunity, namely, the possibility of bearing a child at any time from menarche to menopause. This investment opportunity, as any other investment, carries both benefits and costs. To decide on a conventional investment project, it is enough to ponder benefits and costs in order to determine the optimal time to invest. This is not the case of the investment opportunity we are analyzing here, since the costs of bearing exhibit both uncertainty and decreasing behaviour through time. This generates a value of postponing that a woman should consider if she wants to optimally decide the timing of her first child. From the maximization problem, the critical value of the cost of childbearing is obtained. This critical value or threshold determines when it is worthwhile or not for a woman to delay her first birth. The optimal age corresponds to the time where the cost of

\[\text{Footnote 2: In other cases, entering early into motherhood is a normal step for a woman in an environment without educational opportunities and chances for women to play a different role in life.}\]
bearing equals the critical cost.

In section 3, the implications of differences in women's socioeconomic background are analyzed. In Section 4 we calibrate the model using Colombian data corresponding to fertility and socioeconomic characteristics of women. We make the analysis for three types of women according to their poverty level. Using the real data, the initial cost of bearing and its evolution with time is calculated. In section 5, some comparative statics is carried out in order to simulate changes of the relevant parameters. The exercise illustrates the main implication of our analysis: if opportunities to reach high educational achievements were not dependent of the socioeconomic background of the woman, a poor woman would rationally choose an older age for her first bearing. In other words, early childbearing by impoverished women might be seen as a rational reaction to their disadvantaged situation, where opportunities to reach high achievements are low, independently of the presence of a child. Before concluding, in section 6 briefly discusses some relevant topics related to the timing of the entrance into motherhood, i.e. the number of desired children, the choice of abortion, and the implication of differences in the ability of women. Finally, section 7 presents the conclusions.

2 The Model

We consider the act of bearing the first child as an investment decision for the woman. Women are rational agents who consider the information at hand to optimally decide the age at which they have the first child. As with any investment, bearing a child brings benefits and costs. The benefits include, for instance, happiness and support in old age. The costs of childbirth can be thought as opportunity costs, since there is rivalry between the time and income that woman could assign to many other activities including investment in education (which affects future wages), social networking, traveling, and work experience, among others.

At each year $t = 0, 1, ..., T$, from the age of menarche ($t = 0$) to the year before menopause ($t = T$), women have the option to either bear a child and forgo the potential benefit of waiting, or postpone the net benefits of motherhood and keep the value of waiting to invest (see below the definition of the value of waiting). This is analogous to holding an option in the financial market: at any time $t$, a woman has the right but not the obligation to bear a child at a given cost. In this sense, a question that we are interested in answering is: what is the rule that maximizes the value of the investment opportunity that a woman holds? We keep in mind that the decision of having the first child is irreversible, while waiting is not (at least up to $T$).

Let us denote the option value or the opportunity of investment that nature has given to women as $F(C)$, which represents the objective function that they aim at maximizing. Writing the payoff from having a child at age $t$ as the difference between the benefits and the costs $B - C_t$, the goal will be to maximize
its expected present value:\footnote{3}

\[ F(C) = \max_t \{ (B - C_t) e^{-\rho t} \} \]  

where \( \rho \) is the discount rate, which has the usual interpretation: how women value the future with respect to the present. The maximization process where a woman chooses \( t \) to maximize (1) will lead us to obtain a critical value of the cost \( C^* \) or threshold - \( C_t = C^* \) at the optimal age for having the first child.\footnote{Adapting the model to our concerns, we follow here the directions of D&P (1994), who had followed McDonald and Siegel (1986).}

How do the costs of childbearing evolve with time? It is proposed here that the costs of bearing are subject to uncertainty and are decreasing over time. Thus, \( C_t \) may be represented by a geometric Brownian motion:\footnote{4}

\[ dC = -\mu C dt + \sigma C dz \]  

where \( \mu > 0 \) is the instantaneous conditional expected change in costs per unit of time, \( \sigma \) is the instantaneous conditional standard deviation per unit of time, and \( dz \) is an increment to a Wiener process.

\[ dz = \epsilon_t \sqrt{dt} \]  

with \( \epsilon_t \sim N(0,1) \). Both the potential decrease in the costs of childbearing and the uncertainty create a value of waiting. Indeed, it is important to note that even in the deterministic case, i.e., when there is no uncertainty in the costs \( (\sigma = 0) \), there might still be a value of waiting.

How to explain the negative drift or decreasing trend? One of the reasons why the childbearing costs decrease with time (negative sign next to \( \mu \)) is the decrease in the forgone educational investment with time: when a woman gets older, she either has already progressed a long way in the construction of her human capital, or the chances for her to begin the construction are very low. The same rationale may be used for explaining the decreasing cost in terms of future high wages jobs, since human capital is a major determinant of earnings. The opportunity costs in terms of forming a position on the labor market is also decreasing with time. This is because, as a woman gets older, her opportunities to start constructing a labor career shrink. In the calibration section, the decreasing tendency of educational costs is illustrated, using real data from Colombia.

As for the uncertainty of childbearing costs, one may identify several sources. Let us focus on the educational costs. A woman may fail in predicting \( i \) if her parents or she will be able to financially support her future studies in the presence of a child, \( ii \) if her ability is high enough to continue superior education, \( iii \) whether there will be an availability of credits or scholarships for her to continue studying (incomplete capital markets), \( iv \) or available job market opportunities. The opportunity costs of childbearing may go up or down depending on

---

\( ^3 \) Here we are assuming that the benefits of children - happiness, support in old age - are constant. This is done for the sake of simplicity, as our main concern is the nature of the evolution of the costs with time.

\( ^4 \) Adapting the model to our concerns, we follow here the directions of D&P (1994), who had followed McDonald and Siegel (1986).
these conditions that are not certain. Thinking of the costs in terms of labor market prospects, there is also uncertainty in how costly would be for a woman to give up a period of life that she could spend in achieving a position in the labor market. The uncertainty would be higher or lower depending on several factors like her socioeconomic background, social networking, among others.

2.1 Solving the Maximization Problem

We will now show the way to solve the basic problem by using dynamic programming. We are dealing here with what is known as a stopping problem, where stopping corresponds to bear the first child and continuation corresponds to postponing childbearing. While a woman holds the option (while she waits and does not bear) the only pay-off that she receives is the change in the value of the investment opportunity. Hence, the Bellman equation for this problem is obtained by equalizing the expected return of the investment opportunity with the expected change in the value of the investment opportunity,

\[ \rho F(C) = \frac{1}{dt} E(dF) \]

or,

\[ \rho F(C)dt = E(dF) \] (4)

Equation (4) says that a woman’s decision is optimal only if the benefit from holding the option equals the cost of holding it (forgone benefit of exercising the option). This Bellman equation applies for values of \( C \) higher than the critical cost - where it is worthwhile to postpone childbearing. The critical cost is the threshold that will be obtained by solving the optimization problem. Using Ito’s lemma to expand \( dF \) we obtain

\[ dF = F'(C)dC + 0.5F''(C)(dC)^2 \] (5)

substituting (2) in (5), and substituting \( dF \) in (4), we obtain the following second order differential equation

\[ 0.5\sigma^2C^2F''(C) - \mu CF'(C) - \rho F(C) = 0 \] (6)

where we have used \( E(dt) = 0, E(dz)^2 = 0 \) and \( E(z)^2 = 1 \). Equation (6) is a second order differential equation with the standard general solution given by a linear combination of two independent solutions.

This is,

\[ F(C) = \frac{1}{1 + \rho} E[F(Ci)] \]

where \( C_i \) denote the cost at a time \( \Delta t \) later. See Dixit and Pindyck (1994) chapter 4, for a more general explanation of the Bellman’s principle of optimality.

6 In section 4, we call “the continuation region” all values of \( C \) above \( C^* \), where the Bellman equation (4) applies.
In order to obtain $C^*$ and $F$, we should impose three boundary conditions on $F(C)$. The first condition states that:

$$F(\infty) = 0$$  \hspace{1cm} (7)$$

which means that the investment opportunity $F$ is of no value when the costs of childbearing tend to infinity.

A second constraint is the so-called value matching condition, according to which the investment opportunity $F$ equals the net benefit $B - C$ at the critical value of the cost ($C^*$)

$$F(C^*) = B - C^*$$  \hspace{1cm} (8)$$

This condition simply means that, once childbearing occurs, the woman obtains the net benefit as a pay-off.\footnote{For any other value of the cost, the investment opportunity $F(C)$ is higher than the Net benefit $B - C$.} The objective function (1) will be maximized only if the option of bearing is exercised at the optimal time, i.e. when there is no value of waiting.

Finally, the smooth pasting condition requires (8) to hold when taking derivatives at both sides of the equation with respect to $C$ (at $C^*$).

$$F'(C^*) = -1$$  \hspace{1cm} (9)$$

The smooth pasting condition requires that, for the threshold cost level to be optimal, a small change in $C^*$ will have no first order effect on the net gain from bearing a child, where the net gain is defined as follows: if the woman decides to postpone bearing, she keeps the investment opportunity $F(C)$. If she decides to bear a child, she obtains $B - C$ but loses $F(C)$. This difference $(B - C - F(C))$ constitutes the net gain. The optimal choice of $C^*$ implies the smooth pasting condition (Hogan and Walker (2005)).

We start the solution of this optimization problem - to solve (6) subject to the three boundary conditions - by guessing a solution for $F$.

$$F(C) = AC^\beta$$  \hspace{1cm} (10)$$

Hence,

$$F'(C) = \beta AC^{\beta - 1}$$

$$F''(C) = \beta(\beta - 1)AC^{\beta - 2}$$

Where $A$ is a constant to be determined and $\beta$ is a root of the following characteristic equation,

$$0.5\sigma^2 \beta^2 - (0.5\sigma^2 + \mu)\beta - \rho = 0$$  \hspace{1cm} (11)$$
which we have obtained by replacing $F$, $F'$ and $F''$ in (6). The roots of (11) are given by:

$$\beta_1 = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\mu}{\sigma^2} + \frac{[0.5\sigma^2 + \mu]^2 + 2\sigma^2 \rho}{\sigma^2}^{0.5}$$

$$\beta_2 = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\mu}{\sigma^2} - \frac{[0.5\sigma^2 + \mu]^2 + 2\sigma^2 \rho}{\sigma^2}^{0.5}$$

(12)

Where $\beta_1 > 0$ and $\beta_2 < 0$. The general solution (10) can be expressed as

$$F(C) = A_1 C^\beta_1 + A_2 C^\beta_2$$

However, for boundary condition (7) to hold, $A_1$ should be equal to zero and the expression reduces to $F(C) = A_2 C^\beta_2$.

We use the value matching condition (8) and the smooth pasting condition (9) to obtain $C^*$.

$$AC^* \beta = B - C^*$$

$$\beta AC^* \beta^{-1} = -1$$

(13)

Thus, we find a solution expressing the relationship between $C^*$ and the benefits at the optimal level given by

$$C^* = \frac{\beta B}{\beta - 1}$$

(14)

The fraction on the RHS of (14) is positive and lower than 1, which implies that, in the optimum, the benefits of bearing a child must be higher than the critical value of the costs. The size of the wedge $\left(\frac{\beta}{\beta - 1}\right)$ depends on the values of $\sigma$ and $\mu$: the higher the parameters, the closer the wedge is to zero and the higher the difference between $C^*$ and $B$ at the optimum. We further analyze this point in the next section.

### 2.2 Optimal childbearing decision-making path

Figure 1 shows the optimal childbearing decision making path. In panel (a) we see both, the $F$ curve and the NPV curve, where the three boundary conditions are satisfied: 1) $F$ goes to zero as the cost tends to infinity, 2) at the critical point the woman gets $B - C^*$ as a payoff, and 3) at the optimal level, the two curves are tangent, which is precisely the meaning of condition (9). This is because the value of the investment can never be lower than $B - C$.

We replicate the graph in panel (b) in order to highlight the investment opportunity function, which corresponds to the bold line. Wherever $C > C^*$, it is always better for a woman to wait, since the curve $F$ lies above the net

---

*From now onwards we drop the subscript, since $\beta$ refers only to $\beta_2$. 
benefit line $B - C$. This is true until $C = C^*$, where there is no value in waiting and the woman exercises her option to have a baby, getting the payoff $B - C^*$.

It is less straightforward to explain why the value of waiting is zero when $C < C^*$, given that the curve $F$ is again above $B - C$. The reason is that for values of $C$ lower than $C^*$, the difference between the curve $F$ and $B - C$ can no longer be interpreted as the waiting value: this value would always be high because the outlook of facing lower costs would imply an even higher value of waiting for a child that will never come.\footnote{Dixit (1992) called this phenomenon a "speculative bubble", for the case of an investment project subject to stochastic benefits. Therefore, when $C < C^*$, the optimal path is simply given by the net benefit line $B - C$ and not by the curve $F$.} Equation (14) tells us that $C^*$ depends on the strength of the decreasing trend, the uncertainty and the discount rate. In fact, $\beta$ increases with $\sigma$ and $\mu$, i.e. the more uncertainty about future costs and the higher the decreasing tendency of these costs with time, the higher the value of postponing childbearing (equation (14) implies that $\partial C^*/\partial \beta < 0$). We can easily verify this as follows. Let us first define the characteristic equation (11) as $Q$,

$$Q = 0.5\sigma^2\beta^2 - \left(0.5\sigma^2 + \mu\right)\beta - \rho$$

(15)

Totally differentiating $Q$ with respect to $\sigma$ and then $\mu$, we have,

$$\frac{\partial Q}{\partial \beta} \frac{\partial \beta}{\partial \sigma} + \frac{\partial Q}{\partial \sigma} = 0$$

(16)

\footnote{While $B - C$ is linear on $C$, $F$ is concave given $\partial F/\partial C < 0$ and $\partial^2 F/\partial^2 C > 0$. Hence, to the left of $C^*$ the difference between the two curves will be higher the more we approach to $C = 0$.}
where \( \frac{\partial Q}{\partial \beta} < 0 \), and \( \frac{\partial Q}{\partial \mu} > 0 \). Hence, \( \frac{\partial Q}{\partial \rho} > 0 \) for (16) to be true. Likewise,

\[
\frac{\partial Q}{\partial \beta} \frac{\partial \beta}{\partial \mu} + \frac{\partial Q}{\partial \mu} = 0
\]

(17)

where \( \frac{\partial Q}{\partial \beta} < 0 \), and \( \frac{\partial Q}{\partial \mu} > 0 \). Hence \( \frac{\partial Q}{\partial \rho} > 0 \) for (17) to be true.

The discount rate \( \rho \) is also relevant in determining the position of the critical value of \( C^* \). Totally differentiating \( Q \) with respect to \( \rho \),

\[
\frac{\partial Q}{\partial \beta} \frac{\partial \beta}{\partial \rho} + \frac{\partial Q}{\partial \rho} = 0
\]

(18)

where \( \frac{\partial Q}{\partial \beta} < 0 \). Hence, \( \frac{\partial Q}{\partial \rho} < 0 \) for (18) to be true.

To better illustrate the impact of the parameters, let us compare the equilibrium situation of two different women, one experiencing a higher level of uncertainty than the other. Ceteris paribus, a higher \( \sigma \) implies a change in the slope of the \( F(C) \) curve (counter-clockwise rotation) and, therefore, a shift to the left of the critical cost \( C^* \). As can be seen in figure 2, the investment opportunity curve that represents higher uncertainty, is above the other curve. This means that women with higher uncertainty have a greater value in waiting. For them, the critical cost level is lower, and the expression \( \frac{\beta}{\rho} \) is closer to zero, thus, the difference between the benefits and the costs at the optimum level is higher.

A similar analysis applies for \( \mu \). Ceteris paribus, a higher \( \mu \) implies a flatter \( F(C) \) curve and a lower value of the critical cost \( C^* \). This means that women with higher decreasing trend of the cost have a greater value in waiting. As for
women with higher discount rate, ceteris paribus, will have a lower value of waiting.

It is relevant to notice that the optimal age for the first childbearing, at which \( C_t = C^* \), does importantly depend on the initial cost or the cost at the age of menarche for each woman. The higher the initial cost, the higher the value of waiting.

3 Differences among types of women

In this section, differences in socioeconomic background of women are taken into account. Here we put the example of poverty groups, although the same exercise could be done for ability with no major variations. We briefly consider the implications of differences in ability in section 6. The focus will be on educational costs of childbearing but, again, other kinds of costs could be analyzed for different group of women, probably with some variations in the conclusions.

Let us define three types of women: type 1 - poor, type 2 - medium income, type 3 - wealthy. Women from all groups behave rationally and consider the same factors when deciding the optimal age \( t^* \) for the first childbirth. According to the real option model analyzed here, the initial cost \( C^0 \), \( \mu \), \( \sigma \), and \( \rho \) are the relevant parameters determining the optimal decision. How can we expect the values of these parameters to differ among types of women, which makes the optimal age be different as well?

Starting with \( C^0 \), let us compare women from each of the three types at the age of menarche. The potential achievements in terms of schooling, high wage future jobs, travels possibilities, for instance, are the lowest for the poorest type. They would potentially give up less than their wealthier counterparts if an event as childbirth occurs. This reasoning certainly apply to developing countries, where the opportunities to reach high educational levels and the chances for high wages jobs are much lower for the poor, and poverty affects around half of the population. Then, we have that \( C^0_1 < C^0_2 < C^0_3 \). The value of waiting or delaying childbirth would be higher for the wealthier type.

As for \( \rho \), there is evidence in the literature suggesting that people from lower socioeconomic background have higher discount rates than those from higher socioeconomic background (See for instance Harrison et al. (2002)). We would expect then that \( \rho_1 > \rho_2 > \rho_3 \). Having a high discount rate reduces the value of waiting, thus, poorer women will be less willing to delay the entrance to motherhood.

Focusing now on \( \sigma \), it is reasonable to expect that it might be lower for type 1 women. The intuition is that for poorer women the chances of reaching high socioeconomic achievements, including high education levels, are low independent of the presence of a child, i.e. they experience the lowest uncertainty. In the same line of reasoning, uncertainty on childbearing costs would mainly affect the middle income group: women in this group are assuming a higher risk, since their income might not be enough to bear both childbearing costs and educational costs. As for the wealthier, given that their income might be sufficient.
for both child and school, one could expect their uncertainty level to be lower than for the middle group. Still, comparing to the poorer, their uncertainty level should be higher, since there is still rivalry between the time spent in child caring and schooling investment, which for them is potentially high. \( \sigma_1 < \sigma_2, \sigma_1 < \sigma_3, \) and possibly \( \sigma_3 < \sigma_2.\)\(^{10}\)

With respect to \( \mu, \) recall that it represents the decrease with time in the cost of childbirth, namely forgone educational investment, labor market opportunities, or any other opportunity cost. Thinking of educational costs, as it has been mentioned, women with high income have a higher level of potential educational achievement than low income women. Thus, their opportunity cost of bearing is higher the further they are from reaching their potential educational level (the younger the mother is). However, as time goes on, once the opportunities to invest in education decrease for both high and low income women, the costs of bearing for the two groups tend to zero, given that educational achievements are most likely to be realized within a given time window. This means that those women who begin with a higher initial cost, experience a higher decreasing trend of their cost \( \mu_1 < \mu_2 < \mu_2.\)

One may instead argue that richer women have a larger time window for the cost of bearing to converge to zero, since their educational aspirations are, from the beginning, higher. However, there is a factor making it reasonable to use a similar time window for the three types: impoverished women are more likely to experience periods of schooling desertion. Eventually, they would have to drop out from school, go to the labor market or stay idle, and come back to school after some period. This enlarges their time window and makes it comparable to that of wealthier women. The previous might not be the case if other kinds of childbirth costs different to forgone education were analyzed, for instance, the costs in terms of forgone wages. In that case, the time window for richer women would be potentially higher.

In the calibration section convergence has not been imposed, but the data reveals it. There, the cost is defined as the difference between the potential schooling level and the observed average schooling at each age of first birth. It is observed that the costs for the three types converge to zero at a more or less similar time window, since older mothers are closer to the potential schooling achievement of each type.

Figure 3 illustrates how the optimal path would hypothetically differ among the three types of women. The critical value of the cost \( C^* \) for type 1 women is closer to 1 because of their lower \( \mu \) and \( \sigma, \) and their higher discount rate. Likewise, the optimal timing for first bearing, at which \( C_t = C^* \), is at a younger age for type 1 women because of their lower initial cost. This hypothesis about the difference in the optimal age among types, \( t_1^* < t_2^* < t_3^* \), will be confronted in the calibration section 4.

\(^{10}\)The calibration in the next section shows that, according to our data, \( \sigma_1 < \sigma_2 = \sigma_3.\)
4 Calibration

In order to illustrate the women's behavior described before, in this section we will replicate the model using Colombian data. The database comes from the "National Survey of Demography and Health" (Profamilia - Colombia) and was carried out in 2005. It is a representative sample of 41,344 women between 13 and 49 years old.

In short, we have the following for the critical cost and the cost of childbearing at any time $t$,

$$C^* = C^*(\mu, \sigma, \bar{b})$$

$$C_t = C_t(C_0, \mu, \sigma)$$

Where $C_0$ is the initial cost. As it was announced before, the focus is on the educational cost of childbearing. We divide the population in three types: poor, medium and wealthy. The potential problem of this division is that it takes into account the current socioeconomic situation of the woman, as the survey does not tell us about her background at the age of her first bearing. However, this is not really problematic if we consider that empirical evidence has shown that Colombia is a country with very low social mobility (See for instance Gaviria (2002) and Andersen (2001)). This means that the socioeconomic ranking of women from poorer to wealthier is not expected to have importantly changed.

The cohort that was chosen for the analysis comprises women from 25 to 35 years old. The selection of this cohort attempts to consider two factors: first,
there is a potential truncation problem if young mothers do enroll later to school. Although it is not possible to know with certainty how many of those women in our sample will not attend the educational system anymore, we can check the actual situation. According to the survey of Pro familia, the oldest women currently attending school are 24 years old. Second, including older women in the analyzed cohort would ignore the fact that in the past, the coverage of education was lower. Thus, we could not attribute the lower observed schooling to an early childbirth. Women of this age range were all supposed to have begun school during the mid seventies and after. From this decade onwards, the coverage rates of education have increased significantly in Colombia for all social levels. This makes the sample more comparable.

Let us start by obtaining $C_t$ for the three types. The observed cost at any moment of time is defined here as the difference between the potential schooling for each type ($Sp$) and the observed average schooling of women having their first child at each age ($S_t$).

$$C_t = Sp - S_t$$  \hspace{1cm} (19)

which, as expected, is decreasing with time. $Sp$ corresponds to the mode of schooling years among non - early mothers, namely, those having the child after 23 years old (6.4, 12.5, and 16 for types 1 to 3 respectively). In order to obtain values of $\mu$ and $\sigma$ associated to the database, we use the following result for a geometric Brownian motion, i.e.

$$\log(C_{t+1}/C_t), \log(C_{t+2}/C_{t+1}), \log(C_{t+3}/C_{t+2}), \ldots$$  \hspace{1cm} (20)

are $N \sim (\mu, \sigma^2)$ variables. Although $C_t$, as defined in (19), has a decreasing tendency, the log is undefined in some cases when the value inside the parenthesis is negative, which happens when the actual schooling is above the potential. To avoid this, it is needed to smooth the relationship between $C_t$ and the age at first birth ($X$), by regressing $C_t$ on $X$. The estimated coefficients ($\hat{a}$ and $\hat{b}$) are used to calculate

$$\tilde{C}_t = \hat{a} - \hat{b}X$$  \hspace{1cm} (21)

The previous procedure allows us to obtain, from (20), the following values for $\mu$ and $\sigma$ by types: $\mu_1 = 0.04$, $\mu_2 = 0.052$, $\mu_3 = 0.06$, $\sigma_1 = 0.0297$, $\sigma_2 = 0.04$, $\sigma_3 = 0.04$. We see that $\mu_1 < \mu_2 < \mu_3$ and $\sigma_1 < \sigma_2 = \sigma_3$. This is consistent with the intuition given before in section 3, except for the $\sigma$ of the middle group, which was not the highest as expected. Normalizing the initial cost (the cost at the age of menarche) we obtain $C_0^1 = 1$, $C_0^2 = 1.2$ and $C_0^3 = 1.4$ (these are the relative initial costs of each type with respect to $C_0^1 = 1$).

Considering the Brownian motion (2), we have the following

\footnote{See the results of the regression in the appendix.}

\footnote{As mentioned, $\mu$ and $\sigma$ correspond to the mean and standard deviation of the variables described in (20), where $C_t, C_{t+1}, \ldots$ have been calculated using (21).}
Figure 4: Evolution of the Cost of Childbearing with Time

\begin{align*}
C_{t+1} &= C_t(1 - \mu + \sigma \epsilon_t) \\
C_{t+2} &= C_t(1 - \mu + \sigma \epsilon_t)^2 \\
& \vdots \\
C_{t+n} &= C_t(1 - \mu + \sigma \epsilon_t)^n
\end{align*}

(22)

Figure 4 shows how these costs tend to converge for all types at the end of the analyzed period, reflecting the assumption discussed before that the forgone educational investment decreases with time. It is also observed that the initial cost is the lowest for the poorest type. The curves in this figure have been obtained by applying to each $C_0$ the evolution of the costs described in (22).

In order to estimate the optimal age of childbearing for each type, we would have to know the value of $t$ at which $C_t = C^*$. Likewise, for calculating the critical value of the cost, we would have to know the value of the discount rate $\rho$ for each type, which is unknown and cannot be calculated using the real data. One possibility to continue the exercise is to choose as a benchmark the actual situation. This is, to assume that Colombian women behave optimally according to the model analyzed here. Thus, the observed average age of first childbearing for each type is taken to be the optimal age (20, 23 and 25 for each type respectively).

The critical costs are $C_1^* = 0.68$, $C_2^* = 0.64$ and $C_3^* = 0.60$. Although these values are close to each other, recall that the initial cost is lower for the poorest than for the wealthiest, which implies that the continuation region is shorter for the poorest, as mentioned before. Using this numbers and normalizing the
benefits of childbearing to 1,14 the discount rates that make the critical value to be equal to $C_1$ at each optimal age are $\rho_1 = 0.1$, $\rho_2 = 0.097$, and $\rho_3 = 0.089$. Although the difference is not very big, $\rho_1$ is indeed higher than $\rho_3$, as the existing literature on discount rates' differences by socioeconomic background suggests.

The next step is to calculate both the value of the investment opportunity $F$ at each time - given by $F(C) = AC^\beta$ - and the net present value $B - C$ at each age, in order to visualize the optimal childbearing path for each type of woman, where $\beta = \beta(\mu, \sigma, \rho)$ as it is expressed in equation (12).

Solving for $A$ in (13) and replacing $C^*$ from (14) we obtain,

$$A = \left(\frac{\beta - 1}{\beta}\right)^{\beta - 1} / \beta$$

Thus, the investment opportunity $F$ for each type is as in table 2 (using (10)).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Investment opportunity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>$F = 0.139C^{-1.2304}$ for $C &gt; 0.68$, and $F = 1 - C$ for $C &lt; 0.68$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>$F = 0.1625C^{-1.7827}$ for $C &gt; 0.64$, and $F = 1 - C$ for $C &lt; 0.64$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>$F = 0.1849C^{-1.1592}$ for $C &gt; 0.60$, and $F = 1 - C$ for $C &lt; 0.60$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Now it is possible to illustrate the optimal timing of first childbearing and the optimal childbearing decision path. Figure 5 plots both the NPV curve and the $F$ curve as a function of the age of first bearing for the three types of women. At the critical point, the NPV curve is tangent to the $F$ curve (smooth posting condition).

We can also illustrate the values of the investment opportunity $F$ as a function of the costs. This is done in figure 6. We observe that the critical value of the cost (tangency point of the NPV and $F$ curves) is further from the initial cost as we move from type 1 to type 3 women. The continuation region (where it is better to postpone bearing) is shorter for the poorest type.

5 Simulation

Let us now simulate changes in $C_o$ and the relevant parameters for type 1 women - the poorest group.

Figure 7 panels (a) and (b) show the increase of the optimal age for first bearing if, ceteris paribus, the initial cost of the poorest group is set equal to

14In other words, it is assumed that the childbearing benefits are the same across types and do not vary through time. This simplification may be strong, however, it facilitates the computations and allows us to focus on what interests us more: the costs of bearing.
Figure 5: Optimal Timing of First Childbearing and Investment Opportunity.
Figure 6: Investment Opportunity and Critical Point
the initial cost of the other two types ($C^0_1 = C^0_2$ and $C^0_2 = C^0_2$ respectively). If the initial cost of type 1 women were as high as the cost of the wealthiest group, the optimal age would increase to 27 (the age at which $C^*_1 = 0.68$). For the second case, the optimal age changes to 23 – 24 years.

Panel (c) shows the impact of a change in poor women preferences with respect to the discount rate $\rho$. $C^*$ corresponds to the critical cost if $\rho_1 = \rho_2$, where the optimal age increases to 21 years. If the discount rate halves, $\rho_1 = 0.05$, the optimal age increases to 25 years, with a critical cost $C^*$$''$.

Finally, panel (d) shows that the optimal age changes to 24 if, keeping the same discount rate preferences, $C^0$, $\mu$ and $\sigma$ are set equal to those of type 3.

It is important to emphasize the relevance of the initial cost in determining the value of waiting. This suggests that, as long as the possibilities of poorer women to reach high educational achievements increase, they will optimally choose an older age to begin childbearing. Thus, it is suggested that an antipoverty policy consisting of increasing the possibilities of poorer women to reach higher levels of education in spite of their income constraints, may be more effective than fertility policies to prevent childbearing: a higher expected (educational) cost would rationally motivate women to postpone childbearing. If the educational policy is successful, and the opportunity to reach high educational achievements do not depend of the socioeconomic background as it currently does, this would work like a transformation from type 1 to type 3 (at least in terms of the parameters values).

6 Before concluding

Before concluding this paper, it is interesting to briefly take into account three relevant features that have not been considered in the previous analysis and are related to the timing of first bearing. First, the number of children that a woman wants to have, which may influence the timing of entering into motherhood. Second, the heterogeneity in ability among women, which implies different potential costs of early childbearing and may determine differential incentives for postponing the first bearing. Finally, some stylized facts regarding the choice of abortion.

Quantity of children

So far, we have not mentioned a relevant aspect that may also affect the timing of first birth: the number of desired children. The more children a woman wants to give birth, the earlier she would - most probably - start bearing. In the survey of Profamilia, mothers and no (yet) mothers are asked about the exact number of children they would like or had liked to bear. If the woman is already a mother, the question is: "If you could go back to the age when you had no children and could exactly choose the number of children that you would have in your whole life. How many children would they be?". If the woman is not yet a mother, the question is: "If you could exactly choose the number of children that you would have in your whole life. How many children would they be?".

---

\[13\] If the woman is already a mother, the question is: "If you could go back to the age when you had no children and could exactly choose the number of children that you would have in your whole life. How many children would they be?". If the woman is not yet a mother, the question is: "If you could exactly choose the number of children that you would have in your whole life. How many children would they be?".
Figure 7: Simulations for the Poorer Group of Women.
percentage of women according to the desired number of children, for early and no early mothers (women 25 – 35 years old).

First, it is observed that early mothers want to have more children than no early mothers: while 35% of early mothers want to have 3 or more children, only 19% of no early mothers would like the same. Second, early mothers of both socioeconomic groups - poor and wealthy - want to have more children than their non early mothers peers. 48.6% (24.7%) and 31% (15.1%) of poor (wealthy) women want to have more than 3 children. And third, wealthier women, both early and no early mothers, want to have fewer children than poorer women. This is consistent with the existing literature relating income with quantity of desired children and does not contradict what we have been analyzing in this paper. Poorer women have a lower opportunity cost of bearing a child, which influence both the quantity of children they would like to have and the timing of their first birth.

Table 3: Percentage of Women by Number of Desired Children

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Children</th>
<th>Total EM*</th>
<th>Total nEM</th>
<th>Poorest group EM*</th>
<th>Poorest group nEM</th>
<th>Wealthiest group EM*</th>
<th>Wealthiest group nEM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7+</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own calculations from Prekanski - Colombia.
* Before 23 years old.
(a) EM (a) early mother.

Differences in ability

The opportunity cost of childbearing may vary according to the ability of the woman as well. A potential mother with higher ability faces higher potential costs in terms of forgone schooling investment and forgone high wages job positions. This is a component of heterogeneity among women that is not considered in the paper and has a potential important role in the timing of first bearing. We can try two ways of introducing ability in the analysis. First, as in section 3 for different socioeconomic groups, we may identify three types of women according to their ability low (1), medium (2), and high ability (3). The initial cost for each type would be ranked as $C_1 < C_2 < C_3$. The value of waiting or delaying childbirth is higher for the type with the highest ability level. Low ability type women would have little chances of getting high educational
or labor achievements, independently of the presence of a child, while the high ability women would rationally delay the childbearing.

Second, we could analyze heterogeneity in ability inside each socioeconomic group. A poor woman with high ability, as long as she can access to (good quality) public education or scholarships, can potentially achieve high future outcomes. Her initial costs of bearing would be higher than their peers and would rationally choose to postpone bearing. Analogous analysis applies for a wealthy low ability woman.

The choice of abortion

An early pregnancy does not necessarily end in an early childbearing. A woman can choose to interrupt her pregnancy, or a miscarriage or a health problem may occur. If abortion would be legal everywhere and no ethical, moral and religious aspects were influential for a woman's choice to terminate her pregnancy, one would expect, according to the model analyzed here, that poor (or low ability) women would have less incentives to delay bearing or interrupt a pregnancy. Table 4 shows some statistics from Colombia. Because abortion is illegal in this country, cases of deliberate termination of pregnancy are expected to be underreported.

The two last columns of table 4 show that, among those women that have experienced an interrupted pregnancy at an early age, a higher percentage of wealthiest women, compared to the poorest group, have chosen to have an abortion. This is expected because wealthy women have more incentives to delay childbearing than poor women, an important feature analyzed in this paper.

We would also expect that poor women are more exposed than wealthy women to interrupted pregnancies. The second and third columns of table 4 confirm this, although the difference between the two groups is not high. The features that most influence the difference are the interrupted pregnancies due to extrauterine pregnancy or fetal death, more common among the poorest group.

Table 4: Percentage of Women experiencing an Interrupted Pregnancy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total*</th>
<th>Interrupted early pregnancy**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poorest</td>
<td>Wealthiest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscarriage</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abortion</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health***</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>80.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own calculations from Profamilia - Colombia.
* Women from 25 to 35 years old.
** Women (20-35 years old) who experienced an interrupted pregnancy before the age of 23.
*** Extrauterine pregnancy or fetal death.
7 Conclusions

This paper deals with the problem of early childbearing. Although this phenomenon affects all social classes in all countries, young motherhood is still experienced most frequently among the poorest women. We have used option value theory in order to analyze under which circumstances it is worthwhile for a woman to postpone her first birth.

The (educational) costs of bearing tend to decrease with time and, in addition, are subject to uncertainty. Both factors create a value of waiting, until a critical cost or threshold is reached. The analysis is made for different types of women, according to their socioeconomic or personal characteristics. We highlight the fact that middle and upper income women face higher initial costs of bearing, higher decreasing rate of the costs and higher uncertainty. This increases the value of waiting for these women more than for the poorest women.

An important issue is the policy implications for the poorest groups of women. The message of the paper is that policy measures aimed at reducing early childbearing are helpful since even this type of women face a positive value of waiting. However, as antipoverty policies, early motherhood prevention policies are very limited: the relatively lower achievements of poor women will still be there with or without the presence of a child. This is the reason why we used a lower initial cost of childbearing in our simulations. The fact that poor women face lower uncertainty of the cost of childbearing, in the sense that they very likely will perform poorly with or without a child, reduces the value of postponing.

The previous reasoning suggests that educational policies to allow poor women access the schooling system have an additional antipoverty effect, as long as women are encouraged to postpone childbearing when they have certainty about their good possibilities to reach high educational achievements, independently of their family income.

Pondering social and personal costs and benefits of childbearing is complex, since there are qualitative aspects to be considered for a complete analysis, e.g. happiness and personal satisfaction, on the one hand, or personal frustration on the other hand. However, if we limit the analysis to what can be quantified, such as educational achievements (this paper), labor opportunities, or earned wages, we are able to distinguish the disadvantage of young mothers with respect to non-young mothers. Option value theory constitutes an interesting and useful analytical framework to highlight the importance of considering the benefits of postponing childbearing under certain circumstances, in order to avoid irreversible effects on future achievements.
8 Appendix

Table 5: Cost of childbirth and age at first birth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Group 1</th>
<th>Group 2</th>
<th>Group 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>8.392</td>
<td>9.879</td>
<td>12.121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.085)</td>
<td>(0.654)</td>
<td>(0.699)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age at birth</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard deviation in parenthesis
References


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Número</th>
<th>Autor</th>
<th>Título</th>
<th>Fecha</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Jhon J. Mora</td>
<td>El efecto de las características socio-económicas sobre la consistencia en la toma de decisiones: Un análisis experimental.</td>
<td>May-01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Julio C. Alonso</td>
<td>¿Crecer para exportar o exportar para crecer? El caso del Valle del Cauca.</td>
<td>Mar-05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Jhon J. Mora</td>
<td>La relación entre las herencias, regalos o loterías y la probabilidad de participar en el mercado laboral. El caso de España, 1994-2000.</td>
<td>Jun-05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Julián Benavides</td>
<td>Concentración de la propiedad y desempeño contable: El caso latinoamericano.</td>
<td>Sep-05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Luis Berggrun</td>
<td>Price transmission dynamics between ADRD and their underlying foreign security: The case of Banco de Colombia S.A.-BANCOLOMBIA</td>
<td>Dic-05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Julio C. Alonso y Vanessa Montoya</td>
<td>Integración especial del mercado de la papa en el Valle del Cauca: Dos aproximaciones diferentes, una misma conclusión</td>
<td>Mar-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Jhon J. Mora</td>
<td>Datos de Panel en Probit Dinámicos</td>
<td>Ago-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Julio C. Alonso y Mauricio Arcos</td>
<td>Valor en Riesgo: evaluación del desempeño de diferentes metodologías para 7 países latinoamericanos</td>
<td>Dec-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Mauricio Arcos y Julián Benavides</td>
<td>Efecto del ciclo de efectivo sobre la rentabilidad de las firmas colombianas</td>
<td>Mar-07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Blanca Zuluaga</td>
<td>Different channels of impact of education on poverty: an analysis for Colombia</td>
<td>Jun-07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Jhon J. Mora y José Alfonso Santacruz</td>
<td>Emparejamiento entre desempleados y vacantes para Cali entre 1994 y 2005: un análisis con Datos de Panel.</td>
<td>Sep-07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Jhon J. Mora y Juan Muro</td>
<td>Testing for sample selection bias in pseudo panels: Theory and Monte Carlo</td>
<td>Dic-07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Luisa Fernanda Bernat</td>
<td>¿Quiénes son las Mujeres Discriminadas?: Enfoque Distributivo de las Diferencias Salariales por Género</td>
<td>Mar-08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Julio César Alonso y Juan Carlos García</td>
<td>¿Qué tan buenos son los patronos del IGBC para predecir su comportamiento?: Una aplicación con datos de Alta Frecuencia Financial market and its patterns: a forecast evaluation with high frequency data</td>
<td>Jun-08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Carlos Giovanni Gonzalez</td>
<td>La influencia del enfoque en el acceso y la realización de estudios Universitarios: Una aproximación descriptiva al caso Colombiano en la década de los noventa</td>
<td>Sep-08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Luisa Fernanda Bernat y Jaime Velez Robayo</td>
<td>Los hombres al trabajo y las mujeres a la casa: ¿Es la segregación ocupacional otra explicación razonable de las diferencias salariales por sexo en Cali?</td>
<td>Dic-08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Jhon James Mora</td>
<td>La relación entre participación laboral y las remesas en Colombia</td>
<td>Mar-09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Juan Esteban Carranza</td>
<td>Product innovation and adoption in market equilibrium: The case of digital cameras</td>
<td>Jun-09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Carlos Giovanni Gonzalez</td>
<td>Desarrollos recientes sobre demanda de educación y sus aplicaciones empíricas internacionales</td>
<td>Sep-09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Julio César Alonso y Manuel Serna</td>
<td>Patrones del IGBC y Valor en Riesgo: Evaluación del desempeño de diferentes metodologías para datos intra-día</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Número</td>
<td>Autor</td>
<td>Título</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Jhon James Mora</td>
<td>Labor market segmentation using Stochastic Markov chains</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Germán Daniel Lambardi</td>
<td>Software Innovation and the Open Source threat</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Carolina Calcedo</td>
<td>Medicación del comercio intra-industrial Colombia - Estados Unidos 1996-2005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Juan Esteban Carranza y Salvador Navarro</td>
<td>Estimating dynamic models with aggregate shocks and an application to mortgage default in Colombia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Jhon James Mora</td>
<td>A cohort-based analysis of the influence of minimum wage levels on the labor force participation in the informal sector: quantitative and substitution effects</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Jhon James Mora y María Paola Ulica</td>
<td>El efecto de la educación sobre la calidad del empleo en Colombia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Blanca Zuluaga</td>
<td>Early Childbearing and the Option to Postpone</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>