The role of outsourced security in refugee flows: effects during and after the Cold War.

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Abstract

This paper conducts a quantitative analysis of refugee migration between two historical periods: 1951-1989 representing the Cold War era, and 1990-2004, the post-Cold War era. The determinants of refugee migration over the two periods are assessed and compared using a Negative Binomial Regression Model for a sample of 115 armed conflicts-countries. But more importantly, the main objective of this research is to explore the relation between the evolution of outsourced security and refugee flows, escalating from legally detached mercenary organizations from the mid-20th century to a robust industry shortly before the beginning of the new millennium.

Keywords: refugees, moral hazard, mercenary, private military security company, outsourced security.

Introduction

History has demonstrated that the nature of warfare has shifted continually with the pass of time. As a result, non-linear battlefields and asymmetrical methods of fighting have ushered new non-state actors into the game. What was once known as mercenary groups and deemed as "greedy Rambos", have now weaved naturally into the warfare industry. Their rise after the end of the Cold War led to an intricate network of contractors, known as Private Military and Security Companies´ (PMSCs hereinafter). This phenomenon was encouraged by a set of political and economic transformations that came into place during the 1990s in the wake of a globalized world. However, this is not to say that the privatization of war is a late 20th century trend. On the contrary, the act of outsourcing military capabilities pre-dates this era and can be found within other time periods as well.

As a result, hiring soldiers for either brain or brawn has grown to be a feasible and highly appealed measure to both state and non-state clients who seek to ensure their interests. Nevertheless, their deployment has been tainted with dubious opinions regarding the long-lasting effects on civilians. The recruitment of private security, or mercenarism[1], introduces a legitimate dilemma between the possible gains and costs of their performance on the field.

This article digs deep into an issue that has been off the radar for the most part in scholarly circles, the relation between security outsourcing and civilians. In doing so, this paper follows a less traveled road. Moreover, I proceed to conduct a comparative analysis between two time periods, 1951-1989 representing the Cold War era, and 1990-2004, the post-Cold War era.

[1] For further discussions regarding the many differences or contrasts between PMSCs and mercenaries, see J. Pattison, 'Just War Theory of Military Force', Ethics and International Affairs, 22 (2008), and Coady, Violence, pp. 226. Overall, PMSCs offer complimentary amenities designed to avert battlefield intervention, such as negotiations, advisory and intelligence services (Singer, 2003). Other military services may comprise combat operations, security, training, transportation and logistics.

In line with the above, this paper is divided in five sections. First, it undergoes a literature review of many of the narratives that have shaped the studies of refugee migration, the conceptual dilemma of what constitutes a refugee and its determinant factors. The second section is devoted to the intricate evolution of the privatization of security. Specifically, the escalation from legally detached mercenary organizations from the mid-20th century to robust industry shortly before the beginning of the new millennium. In the third section, the main theoretical argument is further developed through additional discussions, regarding the performance, willpower and the complexities of relying on private security in armed conflicts over the reference period. The fourth section divulges into the research design, the data collection, and the variables adopted to develop a statistical model that can effectively answer the pressing issue that commands this paper. The fifth and final section details the outcomes found in the quantitative model mentioned above and examines the most significant results.

Refugee Literature Overview

The following section aspires to highlight a handful of overridden discussions about the determinants of refugee migration[2]. This paper, first and foremost, recognizes the long-standing difficulty of defining and categorizing the concept of *refugee*. None of the discussions in the field, among politicians, policy workers and scholars, can proceed without addressing this issue. Even though it seems obvious that refugees are affiliated to one of the many kinds of forced migration, they, unlike the others, are afforded a unique international legal status.

A look at the literature shows a multitude of definitions, some legal, some sociological and some anthropological. This paper employs the standard definition that draws from a context of violence, where a person, in fear of being persecuted for cultural, ethnic, religious or political reasons, decides to flee from their home country and is incapable of going back (UNHCR, 2012). The status of refugee is not to be confused with other variations of forced migrants.

Moreover, the "reluctance to uproot oneself, and the absence of positive original motivations to settle elsewhere, which characterizes all refugee decisions" (Haddad, 2004, p. 7), distinguishes the refugees from voluntary migrants. On the same note, the definition of asylum seeker lies on a political limbo since any petition for international protection, thereby their recognition[3] as refugee, has not

[2] For this research, flows of migrants as a result of natural disasters will not be considered in the present text, nor will asylum seekers or economic migrants. The reason not to delve into either of the aforementioned categories is because it is our interest to shed a light on human led motives. These classifications will only be address if necessary in the context of comparison between them and refugees as considered above.

[3] The category of refugee comprises a set of entitlements and access to certain resources or services outside their home country, including legal protection and humanitarian aid. Only those who have been recognized by the refugee receiving state or any further entrusted actor, can ask for the Statutory international protection and benefits that are listed among the many international accords such as the 1951 Refugee Convention, The 1984 Cartagena Declaration, or the 1969 OAU Convention on Refugees. Furthermore, refugees, contrary to ordinary migrants, do not flee because of seasonal changes, tourism or moderate economic crises, but rather more complex restrictions of their own freedom (Goodwin-Gill, 1983, Zolberg et al., 1989). One final consideration is that the term refugee, by definition, excludes internally displaced persons.

been conferred yet by the receiving country. Economic migrants, for their part, are mainly motivated by the possibility of attaining a better livelihood. This population decides to leave their place of origin purely for financial and/or economic reasons, and are not subject of persecution (Black, 2001). It is worth noting that economic constraints are among the many reasons why refugees are forced to flee, but they are not the solely responsible for refugee migration.

Further studies have also demonstrated a strong correlation between political violence, civil conflicts and refugee (Schmeidl, 1995; Singer, 2003; Regan, 2005). In the meantime, other scholars have suggested that refugee migration is driven by a country´s political and economic instability (Moore & Shellman, 2004; Zolberg et al., 1989; Schmeidl, 1997 in Melander & Öberg, 2006). It has also been argued that "countries whose population has antagonized racial, ethnic, religious, or other groupings within those societies, can set in motion a precarious balance of power [and consequently] elongating internal conflicts indefinitely" (Millner, 2011, p. 8). For that matter, the effects to be considered in this paper constitute a collection of distinctive patterns that can be directly linked to domestic political turmoil: abrupt changes of regime, social revolutions, reactions of incumbents to revolutionary challenges, and the reorganization of political communities, particularly the formation of new nation-states out of former colonial empires.

In the midst of the etymological debate and the best predictors of refugee flows, there are other issues that also standout. For instance, author Emma Haddad (2004) has pointed out that while the concept of refugee was initially formulated based on a Eurocentric lens, it was also given an individualistic approach. Following this direction, researchers Grahl-Madsen (1966) and Proudfoot (1956), have denounced the narrow vision that characterized previous studies and their way of evaluating the refugee crises that came after the World War II, especially considering the way that not only scholars but also policy makers addressed the refugee mobilization in Europe, compared to those cases in Africa, Asia and the Americas.

These allegations have not been fully explored despite a solid support from other academics who maintain a strong case of particular features in the vein of African refugee studies (Hansen 1981, Kibreab, 1989 & Harrell-Bond, 1986). Furthermore, Bariagaber, suggests that "unlike the substantial pull forces of the European refugee scene, the African refugee environment, for example, is essentially characterized by strong forces of "push" […]. Patterns of refugee flows are, therefore, best explained by considering political-violence variables only" (1997, p. 33). This certainly shows that the plight of refugees is not homogenous and remains an object in construction.

In the case of some Latin American countries, for example, the rise of a military government during the second half the twentieth century was a key factor in the timing for massive refugee movements. The incarceration of large numbers of dissidents and the repression of political activities led directly to resistance initiatives within those countries, but also outflows of refugees. With the economic, political, and social aspects of crisis so intertwined, it is often difficult to establish which dimension is most responsible for the rising migrant exodus from any given territory.

Further analyses have continued to demonstrate the detrimental link between refugee migration and armed conflicts. In that respect, author Myron Weiner (1966) has carried out an effort to uncover the main causes of refugee movements during the first half of the twentieth century. To this effect, the author has established the following groupings: inter-state wars (including anti-colonial wars),

ethnic conflicts, non-ethnic civil conflicts, and flights from repressive authoritarian and revolutionary regimes.

Privatizing security: a booming industry

Hiring outsiders to fight for private gains is as old as war itself. Literature holds records that trace back from the times of the 19th and 20th ruling dynasty in Ancient Egypt up to the heights of the Roman Empire and the Middle Age (Holmilla, 2012 & Delbruck, 1975). This shows that the business of outsourcing security is not a current trend, but rather a long-lasting tradition. Private soldiers would engage in foreign conflicts either as individual performers, brought in to fight for whichever side bid the highest, or highly organized entities. For both, the important factor was their goal: collect their profit, derived from the very act of fighting.

This phenomenon continued to grow popular up to the point of identifying these sets of soldiers as "The Free Companies" in King Henry the Third´s England, and as "condottieris" during Italy's Renaissance (Singer, 2003). However, their golden years would shortly meet a steep. Due to controversial assumptions about their greedy and immoral modus operandi the mercenary market began to slowly fall, both in disgrace and use over time.

The technological advances and political changes that came with the late modern period by mid-18th century caused a severe downturn for the mercenaries up for hired. The birth of new states following the emergence of a collective sentiment of nationalism emboldened the evolution of 'citizen' armies. In this way, the previous argument that claimed it was "better to spare the local population for something more productive and useful [other than] perhaps a brutal affair, as war" (Holmilla, 2012, p. 63), was traded over a doctrine that encouraged nationalist ideologies. By opting for this political ideology, European states found a way of making the most of their respective populations (Burak, 2012), as they embarked on their quest of holding their national unit together amidst a sea of international conflicts and domestic upheavals that would last until the 20th century.

The sum of all these historical happenings led to the decline of mercenaries, despite a set of notable, yet infamous, gigs during the 1950-1970 decolonization period in which private militias exploited the weaknesses of mostly Latin American and African states. Simultaneously, ideological and political developments caused an outcry among many actors in the international arena who pushed for legislative efforts to regulate the involvement of soldiers for hire[4]. In the wake of a widespread scrutiny against mercenaries, their popularity declined severely (Peterenys, 2016). By doing so, they were almost exclusively employed by rebel groups who wanted to siege power, but also by governments interested in holding their office.

Nonetheless, after the events following World War II a new chapter in the history of outsourcing war began to unfold. The emergence of the PMSCs industry owes it success to a hand full of phenomena that took place at the end of the 20th century. According to most scholars, the Cold War presence, commitment, and the highly rational logic that dominated military activities were replaced

[4] Some international treaties that have determined to control the use of mercenaries include the Additional Protocol I and II to Article 47 of the Geneva Convention (1949), the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa (1972), and the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries (1989).

by policies of active disengagement and arguments for local responsibility for peace, security, and economic development (Avant, 2005; Gaston, 2008, Singer, 2003; Andreopoulos & Brandle, 2012). In a way, clinging to old practices and organizations structures entailed escalating costs and risks for any given employer amidst a changing world.

On this basis, the international community put into motion several privatization measures which served as a leverage towards a globalized world**.** Consequently, major governments began drifting away from permanent military posts to temporary interventions and specialized capabilities. Simultaneously, sovereign military forces witness a gradual decline in numbers[5] of both military expending and "boots on ground", which drove them into resorting to PMSCs to execute the operations they could not carry in the wakening of a different world.

In other words, an increasing demand for leaner, less expensive, and overall more efficient armed forces, eased the rise of the PMSC industry. For that matter, the ongoing process of globalization ushered one, if not the most important, change in military affairs in recent history: the unprecedented privatization of security. This phenomenon broke with the long-lasting Weberian feature of the modern state, the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence. By bestowing military capabilities (e.g. strategic and administrative advice and training; passive security for private and public facilities or logistical support, intelligence, mapping, and risk assessment for potential investors and mine) outsourcing military capabilities became a highly coveted tool.

This is not to say that the state itself was ever on the verge of disappearing, as history has so far proven otherwise. This juncture is a lot more complex than that. Scholar Kevin O´Brien (1998), for example, has stated that the power of PMSCs has been utilized both for and against sovereign state forces. Long standing evidence has shown that unlike orthodox military forces, PMSCs constitute an arena independent from national and supranational hierarchies (Baker et. al., 2008). This has sparked an uproar among certain groups, who even today, remain fearful of potential human´s right violations, based on the unpopular stigma attributed to mercenary organizations and the narrative of "greedy Rambos" that predominantly roamed during the 1960s in troubled territories.

For that matter, various government officials, academics and company´s representatives have attempted to change the perception that people have of PMSCs. On one hand, selected company's executives have step forward to showcase the advantages of hiring private contractors by shedding a light on how they have proven to be an alternative to the collateral effects caused by the shrinking phenomenon of national armed forces and the lack of commitment to intervene in zones of conflict by major governments. For instance, Carafano (2008, p. 38) has stated that:

> *[in Vietnam], for every one hundred soldiers one contractor was employed. [Moreover], during the Gulf War (1991), one contractor was on the battlefield for every fifty soldiers. During Operation Iraqi Freedom*

[5] US military troops, for instance, declined from 2.1 million in 1989 to 1.3 million in 2001 (Kane, 2016; U.S Congress, 1992). In search for more tailorable, rapidly expandable, strategically deployable, and effectively employable strategies, both the US and other NATO countries conducted similar reductions, while seeking a low cost, low risk and low asset strategy for resolving low level conflicts.

contractors made up one out of every ten personnel. Only six years later, one contractor supported government operations in Iraq for about every 1.5 soldiers.

This goes to show both the rapid growth of the PMSC industry and the close reliance of governments in private security over the years.

On the other hand, notable scholars have sparked up discussions about the different types of PMSCs and their respective capabilities. Most notably, researcher Peter Singer (2001) has drawn an analogy in military thought using the "tip of the spear" metaphor, which disaggregates security firms based on their relative proximity to the tactical battlefield. According to this characterization, units in the private armed forces are divided into three types of branches (table 1): (1) military provider, (2) military consulting, and (3) military support. It is worth mentioning that most studies recognize that these categories are at best ideal-types and that many companies provide functions across these areas.

Fellow academic, Deborah Avant (2005), has also theorized about the use of contractors at large. According to the author, the narrative circling around military companies has been tampered with condemnation due to their involvement in foreign conflicts. Even though, the general opinion assures that PMSCs are heavily engaged in direct fire, Avant emphasized that only a handful of private firms in the modern era have, in fact, confronted an adversary on the battlefield.

Table 1

Types of Firm			
Feature	Providers (1)	Consulting (2)	Military Support (3)
Nature of services	Focus on the tactical environment. They offer services at the forefront of the battlespace, engaging in actual fighting or direct command and control of field units, or both. In many cases, they are utilized as "force multipliers," with their employees distributed across a client's force to provide leadership and experience. Include sales brokers, represent manufacturers and contractors in the computer industry.	Provide advisory and training services. They also offer strategic, operational, and organizational analysis that is often integral to the function or restructuring of armed forces. Their ability to bring to bear a greater amount of experience and expertise than almost any standing force can delegate on its own represents the primary advantage of military consulting firms over in-house operations.	Military support firms provide rear-echelon and supplementary services. Although they do not participate in the planning or execution of direct hostilities, they do fill functional needs that fall within the military sphere-including logistics, technical support, and transportation-that are critical to combat operations.
Clients	This type of firms tends to cater to those with comparatively low military capabilities facing immediate, high-threat situations	The clients to which consulting firms and providers firms tend to resort to are quite similar; Likewise, the services both offered go on the same line, however, the main difference between these two relies on the "trigger finger" factor. the task	The most common clients of type 3 firms are those engaged in immediate, but long-duration, interventions (i.e., standing forces and organizations requiring a surge capacity). Whereas type 1 and type 2 firms tend to resemble what

		of consultants is to supplement the management and training of their clients' military forces, not to engage in combat. Although type 2 firms can reshape the strategic and tactical environments, the clients bear the final battlefield risk	economists refer to as "free-standing" companies (i.e., companies originally established for the purpose of utilizing domestic capital advantages to serve targeted external markets), type 3 firms bear a greater similarity to traditional MNCs
Notable examples	Booz Allen Hamilton and Vinnell Corporation	MPRI, Vinnell Corporation	Executive Outcomes and Sandline

Source: prepared by the author, based on Peter Singer (2001) Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and its Ramifications for International Security.

The evolution from mercenary groups into corporate warriors has come along with additional dichotomies for this business. Despite their efforts, some remain wary of resorting to security contractors. Nevertheless, their unique flexibility has allowed them to win concessions with the likes of the UN, for whom they have provided with "logistic services and security for facility, convoys and warehouses, even though, it remains skeptical about the contracting of foot soldiers" (Durch & Berkman, 2006, p. 83-84). This, however, reflects the dilemma that stems from the privatization of security and the ease with which virtually any actor can have access to formerly exclusive state-own capabilities.

The military vacuum that arose after decolonization process and the termination of the Cold War left in poor administrative conditions several countries that proved unable to seize power by themselves (Singer, 2003 & Shearer, 1998). This does not automatically mean that private armies lessened or deterred any type of crises from happening. Outsourcing military capabilities has proven to be equally complex as it is controversial. In other words, the privatization of state authority continued being a pressing issue that clashed with the traditional normative reasoning of war. In the following sections, I seek to expose the effects of privatizing security, but most importantly, the impact of mercenarism over the civilian population in armed conflicts.

A tale of moral hazards, willpower and wrongdoings

The growing reliance on third party actors to enforce the power of law and military security has had several implications. One that particularly stands out, refers to the involvement of hired units in armed conflicts and the costs, unintentionally or not, of such participation. This paper will focus on a variety of concerns that challenge the efficiency, goodwill and commitment claimed by mercenary and private military organizations.

The intrusion of hired soldiers is believed to severely affect the power dynamics in the internal affairs of a foreign country between the authority structures of the government and the opposition forces (Regan, 1998) which can affect the livelihood of the countless citizens caught in the middle. Outsourcing military capabilities can deliberately tilt the balance of power[6] among domestic actors

[6] Patrick Regan has suggested that supporting the rebel movement with military aid, for instance, might not appear to be an attempt at conflict management, while similar support for the government might. However, "an

in armed conflicts by handing more sophisticated weaponry or imparting on ground intelligence to the underdog who was previously unable to fight back, or the national army who needed an extra set of soldiers to mitigate much faster the threat of opposition groups.

Findings in the literature review warn about the nature of the relations held by military security contractors and their clients as *contractual* and cooperative*,* yet, highly deceiving and uncleared at times (Eisenhardt, 1985 & 1989; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976 & Williamson, 1975). Unfortunately, our understanding of this market remains theoretically limited and incapable of catching up to its ever-evolving nature in real time. Much of what has been written on this industry focuses on individual company or armed conflicts/country case studies and is confined to specific regions (usually in Africa and the Middle East), not on the industry.

To grasp the bond fixed between private contractor and employer one can resort to the principal-agent theory as it fittingly encapsulates the nature and effects of these type of bargains. The view of contract terms that underlies much of the principal-agent´s literature identifies situations in which a third party (principal) provides a security guarantee (contract) to a domestic minority (agent) "who seeks protection or enough manpower to carry out other type of chores" (Klein, 1996, p. 455). Furthermore, scholars have also distinguished between two types of principal-agent problems present in contractual relations: those resulting from hidden actions, and those resulting from hidden information (Mas-Colell, Whinston & Green 1995). The former is believed to generate moral hazard; meanwhile, the latter is associated with adverse selection, however, for the purposes of this paper attention will be given to the principal´s inability to observe an agent's behavior once the contract is in place, meaning the moral hazards.

Against this backdrop, the trade that would come into place between the principal (sovereign authority) and the agent (mercenary/PMSC), has sparked wide concern among researchers who have spoken about sovereign authorities growing highly dependent on the professional excellence of the outworkers.

An additional strand of scholars sustain that moral hazards can trigger unintended, yet, harmful consequences that can boost the levels of war´s severity (Crawford, 2005 & Petersohn, 2014). These types of transactions are highly vulnerable to probity hazards, which involve stakes that exist beyond the parameters of the transaction itself (Williamson, 1975). For that matter, loyalty and trust become two very valuable assets in these bargains, even more when the stakes for the public buyer far exceed economical losses. In consequence, any failure in the execution of the operations can cause severe political consequences for the public authorities. As a result, the act of contracting private armies can be characterize as a divergence of incentives around the desirability of directly addressing conflict itself.

To put it more starkly, a contractor´s reputation is based on its performance and effectiveness in achieving objectives, which is why is expected they do not withhold any effort in their quest for success. Yet the task of coordinating both the contractor and the employer´s expectations remains a

intervention on behalf of the opposition is believed to alter the conflict´s previous status quo. Conversely, "when an outside actor intervenes on behalf of the government, it must certainly attempt to restore the pre-conflict status quo ante" (2000, p. 10).

daunting job. In such transactions, the principal is highly dependent on the professional excellence of the contractor, and thus, it is forced to believe in the agent´s willpower to act in accordance with what has been agreed on.

A common threat that remains in this type of bargains assumes that private soldiers will certainly profit from conflict, and thus may not pursue peace even when resolution does not compromise the interests of the contracting sovereign (Frost, 2008; Shearer 1998 & Singer 2002). Broader concerns regarding outsourcing security include its scale, scope and centrality. Likewise, the unprecedented limitations on liability they enjoy operating as corporations with enforceable contracts, as well as their "loose" adherence to international law also bring general condemnation.

As a result, contractors have incentives to strategically manipulate informational asymmetries, monitoring mechanisms, uncertainty, and renegotiation procedures, and ignore procedures designed to align their incentives with those of the principal donor (Miller, 1992). However, without a proper regulatory framework or international willpower to successfully uphold private soldiers, sovereign authorities must risk believing contractors will "stay put" to avoid actions that might potentially jeopardize future ventures. Contractual dilemmas will go onto comprise the fear of the principal being overpowered by the agent. In other words, the ill ability to review full information and accurately oversight the contractor can lead to a complete loss of control of the sovereign authority.

It has been suggested that states who fail to rapidly absorb the grievances of new players will often fall back to violent methods of exclusions, which in turn, increases the severity of violent challenges between the central power and the civilian population (Sriram & Zahar, 2009). Others argue, invoking the economics literature on "moral hazard," that third party interventions may encourage rebellions by weak minorities that would otherwise have no prospects of success, and hence make war and its associated atrocities more likely.

Outsourced Security & Refugees: a hand in hand dilemma

The long-lasting dilemma of outsourcing security has sparked all sort of political, ethical and financial discussions. History, as it has been cited here before, has proven that the military security crises inherited by PMSCs from early mercenary groups, has been a key development to the escalation of violence in armed conflicts. So well intertwined, the presence of "hired units" in armed conflicts has met serious accusations of "human rights violations, oppression and population pressure" (Melander & Öberg, 2006, p. 151). Further research interest in exploring the causes of refugee migration has resulted in more accurate results.

Author Susanne Schmeidl (1997), for example has provided the field with a much-needed clarity on this issue. A series of her more notorious studies have shown a strong correlation between the rise of violence in civil wars and refugee flows. Additional discoveries on her name are concern with two major predictors of change in refugee stock: political violence in the form of genocides/politicides and civil wars with foreign military intervention. Regarding the latter conditional, it is said that they are not only expected to cause large-scale population displacements, but they are more probable to prolong waves of violence (Schmeidl, 1997). Furthermore, authors of the like of Zolberg, et al., (1992) have predominantly profiled both refugees and the employment of security contractors as

phenomena found in weakened states, pointing to ill equipped nations as focus of external intervention.

In other words, the main complications identified in these studies comprise challenges to state sovereignty, unpenalized criminal activities, and the lack of accountability of these companies, to name a few. Further investigations have made of Africa the poster child of external intervention, thus, underlining it´s vulnerability towards business and security experiments in the name of peacekeeping and goodwill. However, this does not mean that other territories had been immune to this phenomenon[7], as many other nations have experienced the presence of outsourced security before. Despite plenty of empirical cases, little attention has been devoted to this issue. Based on the existing studies, it remains unclear if the effectiveness of any intervention carried out by mercenary groups or PMSCs has justified the potential costs. Their deployment typically required specialized capabilities in peacekeeping, crisis response, security, forces training, and pre-emptive negotiations as well as fighting in combat.

Due to a military vacuum in world security and legally policing PMSCs in the last decade of the 20th century, this created an opportunity for them to engage in direct relations with virtually anyone. However, by doing so it left an open window for hazards with such contracts. In 1995 for example, the U.S government began permitting PSMCs to train foreign militaries outside the reach of official security assistance programs or organizations. This meant that private firms began to negotiate their own arrangements with foreign governments, all with minimal degree of public control.

As Kevin O'Brien writes, "by privatizing security and the use of violence, removing it from the domain of the state and giving it to private interest, the state in these instances is both being strengthened and disassembled" (1998, p. 78). On one side, hiring soldiers allows the government to bulk its frontlines, but on the other, the more capabilities it is willing to forego, the more it risks of being overtaken. By doing so, they might engage in illegal activities, thus increasing the destructive power of local conflicts (Grant, 1998). Therefore, a critical loss of oversight of the contractor might result in further manifestations of violence, as they resort to unconventional measures to attain their goals.

Freed from traditional legal constraints and proper accountability, chances for moral hazards sprout across the battle field, leaving civilians with limited options to find safety. In that sense, victims of armed conflicts faced the decision of staying put or seek refuge. Already considered as a byproduct of war, refugees suffer from the collateral effects from military privatization. In addition to undemocratic political institutions, lack of political freedoms and the absence of the rule of law the presence of soldiers for hired has ultimately blurred the lines of orthodox warfare by upsetting the delicate balance of power between, the government, the military forces and the people.

Therefore,

[7] During the 1980´s Ad Hoc Committee on the Drafting of an International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, it was reported that several Western members had unanimously condemned the use of mercenaries and claimed to push for the Ad Hoc Committee's mandate from then on (UN Doc. A/C.6/36/SR.15). However, most importantly, some members echoed the voices of fellow Asian, African and Latin-American countries who feared what the involvement of mercenary groups could do in their domestic affairs (Percy, 2007).

H1: ***the presence of mercenaries/PSMCs command larger flows of refugees.***

Research design

As more theoretical approaches flooded the conversation around determinants of refugee-issues alike, a short list of studies have attempted to examine refugee migration using quantitative methods. For that matter, this section is devoted to developing and testing the hypothesis here presented based on existing empirical research and official figures extracted from reliable sources.

In light of the above, my **dependent** variable, *number of refugees,* is a count of the total number of refugees produced during any given civil conflict. Information extracted from the UNHCR Refugee Population dataset has been compiled since 1951 up to 2017. It amasses the total number of refugees by year, their general composition by location of residence or origin and their evolution over time. However, to meet the ends of this research, I have only taken into consideration individuals, who under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees are identified as such by the UNHCR in its dataset[8]. This variable refers to the stock of refugees generated between 1951 and 2004.

For my **independent** variable, I resorted to multiple sources to collect data on the presence *Private Military Security Companies*, and *mercenary groups* (limited to some cases) in civil conflicts. The data on the variable of interest in this investigation is drawn from Chojnacki et al. (2009). While, the authors provide a list that includes information on the presence of mercenaries in civil wars from 1946 to 2004, I plan to focus on the same period proposed in the previous variable. Additionally, I treat this as a binary variably. By doing so, it takes the value of 0 when there is absence of mercenaries, and 1 when it accounts for presence of such groups.

As it is well known, the fiery debate regarding the definition of mercenarism plays a pivotal role in this research. For this reason, on top of being subject to data availability, this set of variables exclude all actors from the dataset who are providing logistics, training or other non-combat services since they are not participating in combat. Furthermore, local fighters, militias and warlords are not included as they hold the nationality of a party to the conflict. Equally excluded are foreigners who serve in the armed forces of a party to the conflict.

Finally, the dataset includes all actors, who participate in the fighting and who do not fall into one of the excluded categories. This comprises employees of PMSCs, third country nationals, and individual fighters. To avoid further issues linked to the variety of PMSCs and their military capabilities, hence, their involvement in armed conflicts, correctives measures have been adopted, but will explored in depth later in this section. Nonetheless, to truly put this work into motion, it was necessary to merge Petersohn´s dataset, which draws on Bethany Lacina´s study of severity of civil wars during the same period, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, and the UNHCR´s Population Statistic Dataset, to name a few.

Determining which are the ultimate triggers of refugee flows is a complex task. I now go on to describe each of the control variables that have been incorporated into the analysis and foreshadow how they may influence the dependent variable:

[8] This consideration differentiates refugees from people in a refugee-like situation, asylum seekers, internally displaced persons (IDP), returned refugees and IDPs, and stateless persons.

Cold War: this variable is coded as a *dummy variable*. It takes the value of 0 if the armed conflict took place began after 1989 and 1 if it did during the Cold War. The dummy succeeds in capturing some variation in the incidence of foreign military intervention.

Duration of the conflict: This variable evaluates each civil conflict in the dataset by counting the total months that it lasted. The information collected was extracted from various studies and official reports, including Lacina & Gledistch (2005) and Petershon (2014). It seeks to gauge if the length of a civil conflict generates more refugees.

Battle-related deaths: this variable was stablished by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) in its UCDP-PRIO Dataset Program to further improve the measurability of the indicators of armed conflict studies and the effects of the use of force. Battle-related deaths refer to those deaths caused by the warring parties that can be directly related to combat over the contested incompatibility[9]. All fatalities – military as well as civilian – incurred in such situations are counted as battle-related deaths (Strand et. al., 2005). Given the fact that refugees are triggered by severe acts of violence, it is worth testing in what capacity do battle-related deaths spike the number of refugees.

Military quality: This variable was chosen to act as an indicator of a state´s counterinsurgency capabilities. The reason for its selection is simple and straightforward: skilled, well-structured, and equipped forces are more effective, hence, more likely to achieve their military goals (Brooks, 2007). By affecting not only the outcome, but also the severity of war (Keen, 1998: 28). Moreover, the presence of this variable seeks to establish if there is a positive correlation between the level of military quality and the increased of refugees in armed conflicts.

Military quality is defined as military expenditure divided by number of military personnel (Bennet & Stam, 1996 in Petersohn, 2014). The variable is log transformed and lagged by a single year. It captures a state´s military capability one year before the hostilities of the respective civil conflict broke out. Therefore, "these figures may reflect the regime´s accurate forebodings of conflict but not any upsurge in spending[10] or recruitment after the outbreak of war" (Lacina, 2006, p. 285).

Rebel strength: just as the *military quality* variable, this factor is used to measure the capacities of the forces involved. It is coded as a dummy variably, meaning it takes the value of 1 for strong rebel forces being present and 0 for strong forces being absent. Data on rebel strength was extracted from Cunningham, et. al. (2009). Its inclusion in the present study aims to find if the strength of the insurgency has a positive impact over the number of refugees in civil conflict

International intervention: this dummy variable takes the value of 0 whenever there is absence of international intervention and 1 when it does. The Data on interventions is based on the Correlates of War Project Database. External intervention can affect each actor's chances of victory by altering the balance of capabilities required to sustain the fight in the long run which can ultimately increase the number of refugees.

[9] Battle-related deaths, which concern direct deaths, are not the same as war-related deaths, which includes both direct as well as indirect deaths due to disease and starvation, criminality, or attacks deliberately directed against civilians only (one-sided violence). Information was extracted from_ http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed---Conflict/Battle---Deaths/..

[10] Inflation-adjusted data on military spending and data on numbers of military personnel are from the Correlates of War National Militaries Capabilities data set, version 3.01 (Singer et. al., 1972).

Democracy: the literature has shown that democratic regimes face constant oversight by both the winning coalition and its opponents, thus, bringing more pressure to democratic leaders. In contrast to non-democracies, "where the government can suppress and even eliminate opposition, the political process in democracies is designed to generate compromise between the parties and respects human rights" (Petersohnn, 2014, p. 10). In other words, strong democratic institutions are said to diminish the risk of war, while undemocratic or weakling democratic regimes appear to cause the opposite effect.

Based on the restrained characterization of democratic regimes and its aversion towards violent behavior, it was then incorporated into the present analysis. By doing so, this variable is coded as a dummy variable, meaning it takes the value of 0 if such characteristic is absent and 1 if its present; it is worth noting that the present investigation only differentiates between democracies and non-democracies. Information to assess this variable was drawn from the Polity IV project[11].

Ethnic fragmentation: often look as a byproduct of ideological affiliations, those attributed to ethnic grievances seem to be uniquely fixed by a deep-rooted antipathy between the groups that is hard to change, and which even renders cohabitation in the same territory often impossible (Kaldor, 1999). Acting up as a determinant of civil conflicts, this variable seeks to show if it also generates an increase of refugees.

Data on ethnic fragmentation is drawn from Lacina (2006) and treated as a dummy variable, coded as 1 where an ethnic group compromised at least 8 percent of the total population.

Presence of natural resources: While there is plenty of evidence that natural resources may spur armed conflict, empirical evidence for the nexus between this factor and refugee flows remains inconclusive. There have been plenty of cases in which presence of valuable natural resources have triggered civil conflict due to each actor´s will to seek profit out their exploitation. Predatory interests by regimes, private corporations or civilians can spark social upheavals and set off even bigger civil conflicts. Data on natural resources drawn from Paivi Lujala's Article "Deadly combat and natural resources" (Lujala, 2009).

Although several case studies have already considered the effect of resources cleavages as a way to explain civil unrest, we are interested in measuring if the presence of natural resources in civil conflicts generate an increase of the number of refugees. For this purpose, our analysis employs a dummy variable to measure this variable, taking the value of 1 if there is presence of natural resources and 0 if it is not.

To test the effects of the presence or absence of mercenary groups and PMSCs, I employ the Negative Binomial Regression Model, a count data statistical analysis. It is preferable than its more frequently used peer model, the Poisson Model, only because it does not treat the mean and variance as equals. By doing so, it introduces unobserved heterogeneity which helps overcoming the risk of failing to assess cases of "overdispersion" in the data (Long, 1997). Considering this shortcoming, I

[11] The project gathers data on the regime´s characteristics and assigns scores ranging from 0, being the most undemocratic, to 10, being a fully-set democracy. In his data set, author, Ulrich Petersohnn (2014) coded as democracies any country who scored six or higher (1), and to be non-democratic if it scored 5 or less (0). (http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.)

have found that the model chosen is best suited to the present study given how dissimilar are the figures collected in this paper.

The unit of analysis for this research paper is, **armed conflict-country**[12]. It adopts the definition proposed by the Armed Conflict Data Project at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at the University of Uppsala (2005). There are 115 different conflicts in the current version. To facilitate analytical use of the dataset, every participating country/government (source of intrastate conflict) in the dataset has been coded with its respective Correlate of War (COW) identification.

Results

The empirical tests summarized in this section examined if the direct involvement of "hired guns" in such conflicts elevate the number of refugees or not. In this sense, I have calculated three models compiled in following chart (Table 2). The first model determines the general impact inflicted by the control variables to the dependent variable, without taking into account the participation of mercenary groups. The other two models do incorporate the presence of mercenarism.

The second model, as its name suggests, does not discriminate between traditional mercenaries and PMSCs, but rather it underscores the effect that the former had over the flow of refugees specially during the Cold War. The empirical analysis, however, does not demonstrates a significantly strong correlation between the former set of actors and the migration of refugee. For that matter, in the third model I introduced an interaction term (*mercenaries* Cold War*) to ease the process of differentiating the effects between mercenary groups during and after the Cold War. On this account, Petersohn (2017) has demonstrated that the employment of military contractors has significantly changed over time, as PMSCs became more prominent in the following decades after the end of the Cold War.

Table 2. Increase of refugee population during civil conflicts, 1946-2002.

	M.I Baseline Model		M.II Undifferentiated Model between traditional mercenary organizations and PMSCs		M.III Differentiated Model between traditional mercenary organizations and PMSCs	
	β |	P value	β|	P value	β|	P value
Mercenaries			0,2712877	0,600	1,296384	0,044
			(0,51722)		(0.6434776)	
Mercenaries *Cold War					-1,749713	0,054
					(0.90751)	
Cold War	-3,694088	0.000	-3,543275	0,000	-2,63862	0,013
	(0,9486012)		(0,9674785)		(1,065255)	

[12] An armed conflict is a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.

Duration of conflict	0,286886	0,000	0,283797	0,000	0.0259409	0,000
	(0,0070249)		(0,0071251)		(0,0066574)	
Battle related deaths	-1,96E-06	0,145	-2,11E-06	0,075	-1,91E-06	0,005
	(1,35E-06)		(1,18E-06)		(6,82E-07)	
Intervention	2,425649	0,000	2,368442	0,000	2,408358	0,000
	(0,51663961)		(0,5331356)		(0,4945814)	
Democracy	-4,29256	0,000	-4,171846	0,000	-4,012204	0,000
	(0,8413871)		(0,9545758)		(0,8757154)	
Military quality	7,14E-08	0,424	7,04E-08	0,427	9,15E-08	0,316
	(8,94E-08)		(8,87E-08)		(9,13E-08)	
Ethnic fragmentation	0,5194507	0,525	0,5690547	0,483	0,335166	0,643
	(0,8173395)		(0,8105669)		(0,7230964)	
Strong strength	-0,5957135	0,398	-0,4902599	0,517	0,1720685	0,837
	(0,7042204)		(0,7565241)		(0,8382428)	
Resources	-0,2745963	0,575	-0,1664279	0,727	0,0757906	0,881
	(0,489565)		(0,477289)		(0,5079219)	
Number of observations	98		98		98	
X^2	76,61		89,84		94,84	
$P > X^2$	0,000		0,000		0,000	
Pseudo R2	0,0146		0,0147		0,0153	
Log pseudolikelihood	-1024,9775		-1024,9314		-1024,3163	
α	9,764499		9,756586		9,65162	

Note: Coefficients are reported. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses.

The third model, which does differentiate between traditional mercenaries and PMSCs, test for their influence on the dependent variable. The data analysis stresses out that there was no significant statistical difference between the civil wars that took place during the Cold War without mercenaries and those who did. On the other hand, I found the same statistical results when comparing the civil wars that had presence of mercenarism and those who did not in the aftermath of the Cold War (See Figure 1). Once the results of the interaction between civil conflicts during the same period of time are compared, it appears that regardless of the presence or absence of intervention by mercenary firms, the severity of such civil conflicts is so alike that generate similar number of refugees.

Figure 1. Linear prediction of the relation between the number of refugee and Cold War.



The civil conflicts analyzed in the sample that took place during the Cold War and went on without the presence of mercenary groups generated less refugee flows than those who rose in the post-Cold War era and did not have presence of mercenarism. On the contrary, the civil conflicts that spread out during the Cold War without the intervention of soldiers for hires produced less refugees than the conflicts that initiated after 1989 and had mercenaries militarily involved in domestic affairs (See Figure 1). Despite the absence or presence of outsourced security in the case of armed conflicts triggered after the Cold War, these show an upward trend in refugee production versus civil conflicts that did not have the presence of mercenaries during the Cold War.

The model also shows how civil conflicts that took place in the aftermath of the Cold War and did not have mercenaries engaged on the battlefield generated more refugees than the conflicts that happened during the Cold War and had presence of mercenaries (See Figure 1). This phenomenon can be attributed to the more violent nature of the armed conflicts that unraveled during the former period.

Finally, the table shows that civil conflicts that erupted in the post-Cold War and received support from mercenary organizations produced more refugees than those who occurred in the course of the Cold War and also had presence of mercenarism (See Figure 1). This goes to demonstrate that regardless of the presence of mercenary groups in the civil conflicts during the post-Cold War, these are more likely to produce a greater number of refugees than the conflicts that happened in the Cold War. This empirical evidence debunks previous allegations made by PMSCs regarding their responsibility in the battlefield or tactical improvements to deflect moral hazards.

Conclusions

The evolution of the privatization of security has gone through a dramatic shift starting from the early stages of mercenarism in ancient times to the corporate security firms nowadays. More precisely, the emergence of the PMSC industry during the 1990s changed the art of warfare. By doing so, several hazards sprout along the way, such as the increased of refugee migration in armed conflicts. To fully comprehend the lengths of said relation, the present paper has resorted to theoretical approaches and conducted a quantitative analysis. Following in line with this objective, it has been exposed that supporters of outsourcing military capabilities have tried to market the new breed of soldiers for hired as a set of self-restrained and less problematic than their "brawn over brain" type predecessors.

The study found that PMSCs have continued to affect the outcomes of war through a positive effect in the increase of refugees. In addition to the capabilities that these organizations offer, the prerogatives they are handed by the sovereign authorities that employ them, make up for a dangerous concoction. For one, PMSCs services do tend to increase the client´s military chances of victory, however, this usually translates into an increased in the conflict´s severity (Petersohn, 2017). Moral hazards in this case, incentivize agents (security companies) to overturn their contractual obligations with their principals (sovereign authorities) to achieve their goals, even if it means to cut corners by violating human rights or committing fraudulent actions.

After running a statistical analysis, it was stablished that the involvement of modern "corporate warriors", in armed conflicts in the span of time overlooked tend to produce larger flows of refugees than traditional mercenaries. This phenomenon echoes the severity of armed conflicts before and after the Cold War. As seen in the graphic above, civil conflicts predating 1989 generated less refugees despite the presence or absence of outsourced security. In summary, despite undergoing a drastic change of identity, creating new and customized services, and adopting self-regulating mechanisms, these measures have contributed little to improve on the mishaps that help to antagonize their predecessors.

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