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Sobornos o representación democrática: ¿qué promueven los concejos municipales en una democracia precaria en el nivel local?

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Authors

Cendales, Andrés

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Universidad Nacional de Colombia
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Abstract

In the context of a precarious democracy at local level, this article shows that if the council is controlled principally by councilors who promote political agendas that seek to make those individuals who are economically more solvent and politically stronger have a greater and better participation in the provision of public goods and services, then such a representation would be unstable if the council favors only and exclusively the bribes it gets from the mayor in exchange for not imposing a veto on the proposed political agenda in the political negotiation process.

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Este artículo es un resultado del proyecto investigación “Pacífico colombiano, inequidad y depredación: un análisis en modelos paramétricos y no paramétricos” financiado por la Universidad Católica de Colombia, la Universidad ICESI y la Universidad Santiago de Cali.

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EconomíaNegocios y managementEconomicsBusinessEconomía políticaPolítica pública municipalPolitical economy

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Except where otherwised noted, this item's license is described as Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 4.0 Internacional (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)