Sobornos o representación democrática: ¿qué promueven los concejos municipales en una democracia precaria en el nivel local?
Loading...
Date
Authors
Cendales, Andrés
Thesis Director / Advisor
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Universidad Nacional de Colombia
Documentos PDF
Abstract
In the context of a precarious democracy at local level, this article shows that if
the council is controlled principally by councilors who promote political agendas that seek to make those individuals who are economically more solvent and
politically stronger have a greater and better participation in the provision of public goods and services, then such a representation would be unstable if the council
favors only and exclusively the bribes it gets from the mayor in exchange for not
imposing a veto on the proposed political agenda in the political negotiation process.
Description
Este artículo es un resultado del proyecto investigación “Pacífico colombiano, inequidad y depredación: un análisis en modelos paramétricos y no paramétricos” financiado por la Universidad Católica de Colombia, la Universidad ICESI y la Universidad Santiago de Cali.
Palabras clave
EconomíaNegocios y managementEconomicsBusinessEconomía políticaPolítica pública municipalPolitical economy
ISBN
Citation
Collections
Endorsement
Review
Supplemented By
Referenced By
Creative Commons license
Except where otherwised noted, this item's license is described as Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 4.0 Internacional (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)
